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1 Introduction 
1.1 Context and motivation 
The development of digital technologies has put the global society in constant 
change with increasing speed. Companies are digitalising their operations and 
processes to get economic benefit. At the same time, they are improving services 
and offerings by developing new digital business models to fulfil market expectations 
and to deliver more value to customers. (Sathananthan, Hoetker, Gamrad,  
Katterbach & Myrzik 2017, IV Methodology.) This trend is called Digital 
Transformation (DT).  
Digital transformation and one of its enablers, digitalisation, are associated with 
numerous challenges as Rautenbach et al. have stated in their study. One of the 
challenges according to this study is that digital operational environments cause the 
need for cybersecurity to protect the organisations and their data from cyberattacks. 
(Rautenbach, de Kock, & Jooste 2019, III. Methodology.)  
The Security Committee in Finland raised the national cybersecurity competence as a 
challenge in Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy. This competence is needed both in 
business life and public administration. One way to ensure and promote the needed 
cybersecurity skills is to strengthen the cyber and information security as well as ICT 
training programmes in vocational schools, universities of applied sciences and 
universities. (Security Committee 2019, 8-9.)  
Public administration has also started to digitalise its own operations and services to 
citizens. Former Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s government (2015-2019) determined 
digitalisation as one of the main themes in its strategic programme in 2015. There 
were several key projects under theme, e.g. “Public services will be digitalised” and 
“Legal provisioning will be improved”. (Prime Minister’s Office 2015, 18, 27-28.) As a 
result of this strategic programme, for example Suomi.fi web service was launched in 
2017 (Government Strategy Secretariat 2018, 46) and finally the Parliament of 
Finland approved a government bill of Act on Information Management in Public 
Administration (Parliament of Finland 2019).  
 
 
 
1.2 Legal Register Centre 
This thesis is assigned by the Legal Register Centre which is a governmental expert 
agency in Hämeenlinna. The Act on the Legal Register Centre was enacted in 2012 
and the agency started to operate on its current form on 1 April 2013. This act 
brought two state agencies together as a one: previous Legal Register Centre and the 
ICT Service Centre for the Judicial Administration. The current Legal Register Centre 
has three values, accountability, service-orientation, and fairness, which are followed 
in everyday operations with all stakeholders by all public officers. (Legal Register 
Centre 2019.) 
The Legal Register Centre operates under Ministry of Justice. One of its main tasks is 
to maintain and develop information systems of other agencies under Ministry of 
Justice and Ministry itself. It also enforces fines, forfeitures and receivables, and 
functions as a controller of some registers of judicial administration. (Act 625/2012, 1 
§.)  
The Legal Register Centre has three branches: Operational Management Support 
Services, Information System Services and Public and Government Services. There 
are around 160 public officers working at the Legal Register Centre. About half of 
them are working under Information System Services branch. (Legal Register Centre 
2019.) 
2 Research frame 
2.1 Objectives and constraints 
In the beginning of 2020, the previous enactment, Government Decree on 
Information Security in Central Government (681/2010), hereinafter Information 
Security Decree, was repealed, and the new Act on Information Management in 
Public Administration (906/2019), hereinafter Information Management Act, entered 
into force. The big change for central government is that there are not any provisions 
on protection levels in any act anymore. Another big change is that this act is now for 
public administration, not only for central government as the previous enactment. 
 
 
 
There are three objectives in this research. The first objective of this research is to 
study the change in Finnish legislation regarding information security requirements 
in public IT procurements. The second objective is to study what the different 
aspects for data security requirements are in public IT procurements or is there only 
one viewpoint. The third objective is to study what well-formed requirement is. 
Based on the results template for single information security requirement is created 
and the concurrent requirements are renewed to correspond the new legislation.  
The following questions guide the study to achieve its objectives: 
1. How does the Information Management Act, change the information security in 
central government? 
a. Can the previous data security requirements based on the Information 
Security Decree still be used in public IT procurements? 
b. Are there some totally new requirements? 
2. What are the aspects and layers of the information security in public IT 
procurements? 
3. What kind of is a good requirement?  
a. What information is needed in it? 
b. How to make requirement understandable? 
The subject-matter of IT procurement can vary a lot. For example, it can be off-the-
shelf software or customised software. It may also include data centre services or 
devices. Figure 1 describes possible contents in public IT procurements.  
 
 
Figure 1. Possible contents in public IT procurements. 
  
 
 
 
Preliminary study showed that most of the public IT procurements in the Legal 
Register Centre in 2017-2019 have been customised information systems, i.e. 
software development service, and the protection level in most of them has been PL 
IV, i.e. basic level. Data centre service has not been part of them.  
Preliminary study was executed by defining the time period for two previous years so 
that the number of procurements were sufficient for analysis. During this time, the 
concurrent information security requirements were with certainty in use. The data 
for pre-study was retrieved from agreement database and group workspace for 
procurements. 
Based on all that the delineation of this study is the following: 
1. The subject-matter is software development service and the output of that is 
customised information system. All other possible contents of the subject-matter 
and any relations to them are excluded. 
2. The data security level of the data security requirements is so-called basic level. All 
data security classification related issues are excluded. 
3. The analysis done for the chapter 4 of Information Management Act is done from 
the public IT procurement aspect. The daily compliance aspect is excluded. 
2.2 Research data and method 
This study is qualitative research. Used method is content analysis which consists of 
interpretation of the law. The legislation under research will be analysed and applied 
against the general principles of secure coding and other methods and best practices. 
Sources of law are used as research data. Generally, the central source of law is the 
legislation itself but there are also other sources of law. The documents of legislative 
drafting process and legal literature are considered such sources too as well as the 
normal habits and methods in different sectors. 
Because this legislation is new there are not many different sources of law available. 
Therefore, the research data consists mainly of statutory text. At first, the repealed 
Information Security Decree, which is used for creating the baseline. Secondly, the 
current Information Management Act and related government proposal are used for 
describing the current situation. Also, the security agreement and its appendices 
used before the following of the current Information Management Act is part of the 
research data.  
 
 
 
It needs to be noted that term ‘data security’ is used in chapter 4 and in its 
subchapters instead of its normal synonym information security. The reason is that 
term data security is used in the English version of the Information Management Act. 
Because chapter 4 contains citations from the act the compliance with the 
terminology wanted to be maintained by using the same terminology. Term 
‘information security’ is used elsewhere in this document and it means the same as 
data security. 
3 Regulations and requirements  
3.1 Public Procurements 
Public procurements are procurements of any goods and services as well as building 
contracts funded with public finance (Pekkala, Pohjonen, Huikko & Ukkola 2019, 19). 
They are decreed in the act 1397/2016 Act on Public Contracts and Concessions, 
hereinafter the Procurement Act. The aim of this act is to optimise the use on public 
monetary resources. It also furthers making of high-quality, innovative and lasting 
procurements and safeguards fair competition for providers in government 
procurements (Act 1397/2016, 2 §). 
According to Pekkala et al. (2019,16) the public procurements can be divided in four 
categories: 
1. small-scaled procurements (procurement value below national threshold values), 
2. national procurements (procurement value over national threshold values but below 
EU threshold values) 
3. EU procurements (procurement value over EU threshold values) and 
4. social and health services and other special service procurements as well as licensing 
agreements. 
The valid threshold values for central government authorities are shown in Table 1 
(ibid., 19).  
  
 
 
 
Table 1. National and EU threshold values in public procurements for central 
government authorities. 
Type of Procurement Threshold Value (VAT excl.) 
Goods and services 60 000 € (national), 144 000 € (EU) 
Building contracts 150 000 € (national), 5 548 000 € (EU) 
Social and health services 400 000 € (national) 
 
The Procurement Act does not apply to small-scaled procurements. Instead, general 
administrative laws are applied to them; the act 621/1999 Act on the Openness of 
Government Activities, hereinafter Openness Act, and the act 434/2003 
Administrative Procedure Act. The Procurement Act applies to the three other 
categories of procurements. (Pekkala et al. 2019, 26.) 
The whole procurement process consists of several procedures (Kuuttiniemi & 
Lehtomäki 2017, 52). However, four main phases presented in Figure 2 can be found 
there. 
 
Figure 2. Four main phases of procurement process. 
All the main phases and procedures in them are now presented straightforward and 
simplified with the following constraints. At first, the presumption is that the 
information system procurements exceed the EU threshold value. Therefore, only 
those procedures used for procurements exceeding the EU threshold value are 
introduced here. Secondly, it is assumed that the funding for the procurement is 
arranged. The last presumption is that the contracting entity follows the non-
discriminatory manner and other rules throughout the whole procurement process.  
  
 
 
 
The procurement process is more complicated than the following description shows. 
There are, for example, standstill periods, time limits and detailed requirements for 
content of the call for tenders as well as appealing procedures. Because they are not 
relevant to the understanding of the big picture of the procurement process, they 
are excluded to keep the description simple. 
3.1.1 Definition phase  
As Pekkala et al. (2019, 358) state, the preparation task is the most important matter 
in the public procurement, and it needs time and resources from all stakeholders. 
The more complex the subject-matter of the procurement is the more time and 
stakeholder cooperation is needed in this task. It is important to all stakeholders to 
understand that all the decisions and definitions concerning the subject-matter of 
the procurement and the conditions for procurement are made during the 
preparation task, and that all this impacts to the result of the whole procurement. 
There is documentation which need to be composed during the preparation so that it 
is ready when contract notice and call for tender are published (Act 1397/2016, 68 
§). 
After the preparation of the procurement, the contracting entity can screen the 
market with the preliminary market consultations. It gives the possibility for the 
contracting entity to consult the market and get the information if there are any 
solutions available. The contracting entity can change the content and specifications 
of the subject-matter of the procurement on that basis. The possible tools for 
preliminary market consultations are request for information and technical dialogue 
(Kuuttiniemi & Lehtomäki 2017, 136-137.) as well as independent market screening, 
presentations by suppliers, briefings by the contracting entity and utilising 
experience of different parties, such as other authorities (Pekkala et al. 2019, 361-
363). 
The procurements exceeding the EU threshold value have many different procedures 
to choose from. Each of them has its own specialities. The contracting entity needs to 
choose the most suitable procedure for the future procurement. (Kuuttiniemi & 
Lehtomäki 2017, 138.) The Legal Register Centre has mainly used the open 
 
 
 
procedure, the restricted procedure and negotiated procedure. Therefore, only these 
three procedures are introduced. 
The open procedure is the simplest procedure with only one phase. It starts with the 
publication of the contract notice and call for tender. All willing suppliers can 
participate in tendering. (Kuuttiniemi & Lehtomäki 2017, 138-139.) 
The restricted procedure has two phases. It also starts with the publication of the 
contract notice and call for tender. After the publications, all willing suppliers can 
submit a request to participate in the tendering. Based on the requests, the 
contracting entity chooses the candidates that are allowed to bid. (ibid., 140.) 
These two previously mentioned procedures are the preferred procedures and they 
have no preconditions to fill. The disadvantage in them is that the contracting entity 
has no possibilities to negotiate with the suppliers during the procurement 
procedure. The possibility to negotiate during the procedure is useful in complex 
procurements, e.g. information systems with customised needs. 
The negotiated procedure also has two phases. It starts with the publication of 
contract notice and preliminary call for tender or project description. After the 
publication, all the willing suppliers can submit a request to participate in the 
tendering. Based on the requests, the contracting entity chooses the candidates with 
whom to negotiate the conditions of contract. (ibid., 141.) It should be taken into 
account that the contracting entity can negotiate only on those terms that are not 
announced as the minimum requirements of the procurement. The disadvantage of 
this procurement procedure is that it might be both time- and money-consuming. 
(Pekkala et al. 2019, 215.) 
It is not allowed to use the negotiated procedure in all procurements. However, it is 
acceptable for contracting entity to use this procedure, inter alia, in the following 
situations: (ibid., 216) 
• procurements which need customisation to fulfil the needs of the contracting entity, 
• procurements which include innovative solutions and designing and 
• procurements which after open or restricted procedure did not get tenders which 
comply with the call for tender or obtained tenders are not acceptable.  
 
 
 
After the preparation and possible screening of the market have been conducted and 
the procurement procedure is selected contracting entity needs to compose and 
publish the contract notice and the preliminary call for tender. Now the definition 
phase has been done, and it can be moved to the next phase.  
3.1.2 Tendering phase 
In tendering phase, the performed operations vary between the procurement 
procedures. The different tendering phase processes are described for open, 
restricted and negotiated procedures. 
In the open procedure, the tendering phase is the simplest. It includes receiving and 
opening the tenders, checking the suitability of the tenderers and if the tenders 
comply with the call for tenders, and finally comparing the tenders. If the tenderer is 
not suitable or the tender does not comply with the call for tenders, the contracting 
entity makes the decision on exclusion and notifies it separately or in final decision 
phase. (Kuuttiniemi & Lehtomäki 2017, 52)  
In the restricted procedure, the first task in the tendering phase is receiving the 
requests to participate in tendering from the willing candidates. The contracting 
entity needs to evaluate the suitability of the candidates and make the decision who 
can participate in tendering. If the candidate does not meet the requirements set in 
the contract notice and call for tenders, the contracting entity composes the decision 
on exclusion and notifies it. After that the contracting entity composes call for 
participation in tendering and sends it to the accepted candidates. (Pekkala et al. 
2019, 213.) 
After that the contracting entity receives and opens the tenders. Then it checks if the 
tenders comply with the call for tenders. If not, the contracting entity makes the 
decision on exclusion and notifies it separately or in the final decision phase. (ibid., 
213.) 
The tendering phase of the negotiated procedure also starts with receiving the 
requests from the willing candidates to participate in tendering, selecting the 
participating candidates and possible exclusion of candidates. After that the 
 
 
 
contracting entity sends the call for participation in tendering and preliminary call for 
tenders to the candidates. (Pekkala et al. 2019, 217.) 
Next, the contracting entity starts to negotiate with the candidates. It is prohibited to 
negotiate the minimum requirements of the procurement; however, all terms and 
content of the procurement are negotiable. It is possible to have as many 
negotiations rounds as possible. When the negotiations are over the contracting 
entity sends the final call for tenders to the candidates. After that the contracting 
entity checks if the tenders comply with the final call for tenders. (ibid., 217.) 
3.1.3 Decision phase 
The decision phase starts with the comparison of the tenders that comply with the 
call for tenders. The next step is to compose the procurement decision and notify 
that. This is followed by the signing of the contracting agreement. (Kuuttiniemi & 
Lehtomäki 2017, 52.) Because of the Openness Act the public procurement 
documents are public. Confidential business or expertise information of candidates 
can be classified.  (Kuuttiniemi & Lehtomäki 2017, 199.) 
3.1.4 Supervision phase 
The contracting entity needs to supervise the fulfilment of the contracting 
agreement. If the contracting entity notices any faults or imperfections in delivery, it 
must inform the supplier immediately and make sure that these defects are 
corrected. The contracting entity also needs to document the delivery of the service 
to invoices. (Kuuttiniemi & Lehtomäki 2017, 129.) 
3.1.5 Why do public IT procurements fail? 
Even though public procurements are well guided by the law, there are several 
examples of unsuccessful IT-projects and procurements in public administration. For 
example, the criminal conviction system Ritu exceeded its budget by about 1.6 M€ 
and was delayed by about 1.5 years (Vänskä 2017). In addition, users found this 
system difficult to use, and it also slowed down the processes in courts when it was 
released (Hartig 2014).  
 
 
 
The Ministry of Justice ordered an assessment to be made by external consultants to 
find out what the reasons for the failure of the project were (Hartig 2014). According 
to the report, several mistakes were made during the whole project. In the beginning 
the future users did not participate in preparation phase. Also, the steering and the 
management of the project was inadequate and because of that, the decision making 
did not work. The supplier had some internal problems with its organisation and 
communication. After the change of project manager and renewal of project 
organisation, the quality of the information system improved. (Storås 2014.) 
Karoliina Luoto, the procurement consultant said in her interview for Lakimiesuutiset 
[Lawyer news] magazine that the big problem in public administration’s IT-projects is 
the current operating model. Information systems are renewed every 10-15 years; 
however, not enough resources are allocated to maintain and further develop them. 
This leads to the situation that the whole system needs to be renewed at one time 
which usually takes years. The world usually changes during the long renewal project, 
and the information system might even be outdated when it is released. One 
solution to avoid this is to update the old applications constantly. In that way the 
renewal projects do not become uncontrollable and long-lasting. (Aukia 2018.) 
Aapo Koski states in his doctoral thesis that more attention should be paid to public 
procurements and tendering in the starting phase. The work carried out in this phase 
has an enormous impact to the following phases and to the whole result. (Koski 
2019. 74.) 
As a summary, there is not just one cause for failures of public IT procurements. It is 
a cumulative sum of all the defects within the whole process from the preparation to 
the development and release. 
  
 
 
 
3.2 Requirements 
3.2.1 Requirements engineering 
Proper requirements engineering is one of the prerequisites for successful software 
project. Many experts, such as Leffingwell and Widrig (2003), have found out in their 
studies that in over 60 % of the cases the reason for failures is the bad requirements 
engineering. (Haikala & Mikkonen 2011, 61.)  
Requirements engineering is the operation in a software project where the 
requirements of the system are established and maintained (ISO/IEC/IEEE 24765, 
2017, 381). Requirements engineering can be divided into two parts: requirements 
definition and requirements management. (Haikala & Mikkonen 2011, 65). The 
former is the establishment part and the latter the maintenance part of the 
requirements engineering. 
The requirements definition is a process which consists of requirements elicitation, 
requirements analysis, requirements specification and requirements validation. The 
main process in requirements management is the change management of the 
requirements. The change management process starts with the change request 
which is then analysed and either approved or rejected. If the change request is 
approved, then the request in question is updated according to the request. The 
version control of the requirements is maintained in requirements management as 
well as the traceability of the requirement. The traceability of the requirement 
means that the requirement can be traced from its definition to its deployment and 
testing. (Haikala & Mikkonen 2011, 63-76.) 
The earlier explained structure of requirements engineering is showed in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Structure of requirements engineering. 
 
In literature (Haikala & Mikkonen 2011, 61; Robertson & Robertson 2014, 40-42) 
requirements are typically divided into three categories: 
• functional requirements, 
• non-functional requirements and 
• constraints. 
According to Robertson and Robertson (2014), the functionality of the software, in 
other words, what the information system must do, are specified in functional 
requirements. These functionalities are necessary for the system to work, and they 
are used by software developers to develop the software. (253-254.)  
Non-functional requirements, on the other hand, describe the quality features of the 
software. They describe, for example, the usability and security of the system. (ibid., 
276-277.) In the other words, non-functional requirements describe the qualities the 
system must fulfil to operate as it needs to operate.  
Constraints are the kind of requirement used to give limitations and restrictions to 
the system or even the whole project (ibid., 41-42). An example of such constraining 
requirement can be the programming language that should be used for system 
development. 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Characteristics of well-formed requirements 
Well-formed requirements state what is needed, not how.  They define performance 
or capacity of system, not of the user or other operator. Well-formed requirements 
can contain conditions and be limited by constraints. Conditions are measurable 
quantitative or qualitative attributes and needed to complete the requirement. 
Constraints, on the other hand, set restrictions for implementation and can for 
example be originated from legislation or from existing implementation. 
(ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148:2018, 10-14.) 
When requirements are expressed by using natural language, they should be written 
with full sentences and with an active voice, i.e. with subject and verb. Sentences 
shall be completed with constraint of action, object and conditions. It is not 
mandatory to use all of them in all cases. (ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148:2018, 11.) 
According to ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148:2018 standard, it should be agreed on specific 
keywords that guide if the requirement is mandatory or non-mandatory or shows 
preferences and goals or suggestions and allowances. In mandatory requirement 
‘shall’ should be used and in non-mandatory ‘will’. Preferences and goals should be 
expressed with ‘should’ and suggestions and allowances with ‘may’. (ISO/IEC/IEEE 
29148:2018, 11.) The possibility to use such keywords is fully dependent of 
characteristics of used language. 
Requirements should be written using positive statements but one should avoid 
using vague and general terms. The use of ambiguous terms requirements become 
difficult or impossible to verify. Examples of such terms are superlatives, subjective 
expressions, adverbs and comparative phrases. Expressions like ‘if possible’ should 
also be avoided because they set loopholes. (ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148:2018, 14.)  
The international standard ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148 (2018, 12-13) also specifies nine 
characteristics for an individual requirement which every requirement should 
possess. These characteristics are listed and explained in Table 2. 
  
 
 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of an individual requirement. 
Characteristic Description 
Necessary Every requirement should have a need which cannot be 
fulfilled with another requirement. 
Appropriate The content of the requirement is relevant and is suited 
to the level of entity, avoiding any unnecessary 
constraints and allowing independent implementation 
of the requirement. 
Unambiguous The individual requirement is easy to understand. 
Complete 
There is no need for any other information to 
understand the individual requirement. 
Singular The individual requirement is particular. 
Feasible 
The implementation of the individual requirement is 
achievable by resources of the project. 
Verifiable 
The realisation of the individual requirement can be 
proven after its implementation. 
Correct 
The description of the individual requirement is 
accurate and correctly describes the need. 
Conforming 
The individual requirement conforms to the form and 
language requirements set in advance. 
 
3.3 Legislative drafting process of the Act on Information Management 
in Public Administration (906/2019) 
The Finnish legislative drafting process consists of seven stages: preliminary 
preparation, regulatory drafting, consultation, continued drafting, review by the 
government, parliamentary review and enactment. There needs to be an initiative 
for the legislation before the process starts. After the process, the act is published in 
 
 
 
the Statute Book and the enforcement and the monitoring of the act begins. (Finlex 
n.d., Legislative Drafting Process Guide.)  
The initiative for the Information Management Act came from Government 
Programme of former Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s government. It was essential part 
of one key project of the programme called Public services will be digitalised. The 
objective was to establish one ordinary law for information management. (Prime 
Minister’s Office 2015, 26-27.) 
The preliminary preparation work started in November 2016 when the Ministry of 
Finance appointed a preparatory body to research the development needs of 
information management legislation. The term of the preparatory body was 17 
November 2016 - 31 May 2017. The first target timetable to enter the new act into 
force was March 2018. (Ministry of Finance 2016.) 
The preparatory body published its report in September 2017. It was stated in the 
report that concurrent legislation was fragmented, plentiful and inaccurate and did 
not correspond to operational environment of the 21st century. It was also noticed 
that information management area contained both common and sector-based 
regulation which is partly overlapping and parallel. According to the report, the basis 
of the ordinary law should be clear so that it is possible to cancel and equalise the 
overlapping and parallel regulation. (Ministry of Finance 2017a.) 
The legislative drafting process continued and the aim for government proposal was 
spring term 2018. The second target to enter the new act into force was in the 
beginning of 2019. (Ministry of Finance 2017b.) 
The regulatory drafting work started in January 2018 when the Ministry of Finance 
set both a working group and a steering group to support the working group. The 
term for both groups was 10 January 2018 - 30 September 2018. The working group 
established a draft government bill (Ministry of Finance 2018a.) and requested 
comments for the draft in August 2018 (Ministry of Finance 2018b). 
  
 
 
 
The Ministry of Finance prepared the government bill during its term and it was 
reviewed by the Government in December 2018. The decision of the Government 
was to submit the government bill to Parliamentary review. (Finnish Government 
2018.)  
The preliminary debate for the government bill also took place in December 2018. 
The government bill was then sent to the Administration Committee for its report. 
The Administrative Committee then asked for a statement from the Constitutional 
Law Committee which gave its statement in February 2019. The Administration 
Committee gave its report in March 2019. The bill was then debated in two plenary 
sessions in March 2019 and the Parliament approved the bill. The parliament gave its 
response in June 2019 (Parliament of Finland 2019) and the president approved the 
act in August 2019.  
3.4 Digital security in public sector 
Digital security is a new and non-stabilised term also used by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Digital security means the issues 
related to risk management, continuity and contingency, information security, data 
protection and cybersecurity, as showed in Figure 4. (Ministry of Finance 2020b, 16.)  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Digital security after the Ministry of Finance.  
 
 
 
 
As showed in Figure 5, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for steering the digital 
security in public sector. To fulfil this, it set up the Strategic Management Group for 
Digital Security. The mission of the group is to operate in the strategic level by 
creating national digital security cooperation model and coordinating its fulfilment. It 
also evaluates digital security situation in public administration. (Ministry of Finance 
n.d., Digitaalisen turvallisuuden strateginen johtoryhmä.)  
 
 
 
Figure 5. The structure of steering and developing digital security in public sector.  
 
The Ministry of Finance has also nominated the Information Management Board. The 
board is promoting the development and enforcement of the information 
management in public administration. This can be done, for example, by publishing 
concrete recommendations. (Ministry of Finance 2020a, Bulletin 27 January 2020). 
The operation of the board is based on Information Management Act (Act 906/2019, 
10 §).   
The Digital and Population Data Services Agency, hereinafter DVV, operates under 
the Ministry of Finance. DVV has nominated the Public Administration Digital 
Security Management Board, VAHTI, which is an operational level and cross-
management group. The scope for VAHTI is to improve the digital security, the 
security culture and attitude in public administration. VAHTI also coordinates the 
cooperation of the organisations which are responsible for service production. In 
 
 
 
addition, it produces a situational picture of the digital security in public 
administration. VAHTI participates in operationally executing the digital security 
development programmes and projects set by the Ministry of Finance. (DVV n.d., 
Julkisen hallinnon digitaalisen turvallisuuden johtoryhmä VAHTI.) 
In addition, a Cyber Security Director also operates in Finland. This post is established 
at Ministry of Transport and Communications and its objective is to coordinate the 
development of cybersecurity in Finland. (Security Committee 2019.)  
4 Results 
4.1 Analysing content of subject-matter 
Data security requirements define the wanted security level for the subject-matter. 
To set up a certain security level, the authority needs to define of the content of 
subject-matter, in other words service.  
The service consists of two parts, service production, and service output. The 
authority needs to understand the big picture of the service. Depending on the 
content of the subject-matter, there can be, for example, more than one output and 
this can lead to the situation where service production can include more sections. 
In this case, where the subject matter is the development work of a customised 
information system, there is only one service output, the customised information 
system. On the other hand, service production can be divided into two sections: the 
administrative part including management and controlling work and the software 
development work which can still be separated in two more sections. These are the 
development part and the maintenance part because nowadays a trend in software 
development is to use agile methods. The idea of agile methods is to create value to 
customers as early as possible. Therefore, the information system is developed and 
released in smaller functional pieces so the software can be in production while it is 
still developed. The previous waterfall method first developed the software and then 
released the whole system at one time.  
 
 
 
The needed security level of service production fully depends on the required 
security level of the service output. When the authority is defining the properties and 
features of the service output, it also needs to define the required security level for 
it.  
The key principles in procurements are equitableness, non-discrimination, and 
transparency. This means, for example, that brands cannot be used when defining 
the subject-matter. So, this leads to the situation that detailed requirements cannot 
be defined to the system. In the case of customised information system, it is not 
necessarily known what technology the system is based on. 
As it can be seen there are relations and dependencies between these actors and the 
combination seems to be confusing. Therefore, the model of three-level requirement 
setting for public IT procurements was created to clarify the integrity. This model is 
showed in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. The three levels of data security requirements in public IT procurements.  
 
The first level of the data security requirements are the requirements are set by the 
authority. The purpose of these first level requirements is to ensure the data security 
requirements are suitable and customised for the subject-matter and cover all parts 
of the acquired service and its outputs. These are treated in more detail in chapter 
4.2 Defining the required security level of the subject-matter. 
 
 
 
The second level requirements in Figure 6 have two parts; however, there can be 
more of them. The amount depends on the amount of service production sections. 
Here, in this case, there are two as explained earlier. These second level 
requirements are steering the production of service output so that the output fulfils 
the required security level. These requirements are part of the call for tender and 
therefore, it is important that they are set up carefully and customised to suit the 
subject-matter. The data security requirements from the Information Management 
Act need to be observed in these requirements. This is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 4.3 Data security in the Information Management Act. 
The third level requirements will be set when the tendering is finished, and the 
supplier has been chosen. Then the implementation method is known, and the 
detailed technical requirements can be set. These requirements can, for example, be 
detailed hardening requirements or configuration details. These are set during 
development project and documented there. Because setting up the third level 
requirements is not part of any phase of the procurement process and therefore out 
of the scope of this study, they are not treated more detailed in this document. 
4.2 Defining required security level of the subject-matter 
Confidentiality, integrity and availability, the CIA-triad, are the elementary principles 
in data security. The authority shall observe these three factors when eliciting the 
required security level of the subject-matter and assessing the risks. The authority 
also needs to observe the requirements from the Information Management Act. 
Definition work is combination of different factors and issues with many relations 
and dependencies. All the requirements that are written as a result of identification 
and analysis of issues may not necessarily be data security requirements but 
requirements for other area. Figure 7 is clarifying this. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 7. CIA-triad with dependencies from Information Management Act. 
 
The issues applied in the Information Management Act are written with white font 
and lower-case characters. They have impacts on and are impacted by the issues 
which are elicited when the subject-matter is defined. These issues are written with 
pale-orange colour and lower-case characters with border lines around them. Both 
issues have impacts on and are impacted by the principles of data security which are 
written with upper-case characters and pale-yellow colour. 
For example, there might be a certain demand and requirement for system 
performance. It is not a data security requirement but has impacts to the availability 
of the system. To give another example, in the Information Management Act, there is 
a requirement for the management of access rights. This protects the confidentiality 
of the system. This feature needs to be observed in the system architecture. 
The issues presented in Figure 7 do not present a complete list of all possible issues 
but rather demonstrate possible issues. The definition of data security requirements 
is easier when the persons behind the definition work understand this big picture 
and perceive the dependencies. 
 
 
 
When defining the security level of the customised information system, the authority 
needs to define at least the following issues: 
• the criticality of the information system,  
• the content and classification of the data,  
• geographical location for data storage and  
• data flows and integrations. 
The authority also needs to define the following issues related to the service 
production: 
• needed competence and competence level for supplier’s employees, data security 
included, 
• geographical location for service production and  
• the classification of data given to the supplier or where the supplier has access. 
There is a list of supporting questions in Appendix 1. They can be used for eliciting 
the information security related needs which are then analysed and written as data 
security requirements. There are questions concerning the data, supplier and 
information system. 
4.3 Data security in the Information Management Act 
This chapter introduces the data security part of the Information Management Act. 
There are six sub-chapters, one for each section which issues provisions on non-
security-classified issues on chapter 4 Data security of the Information Management 
Act. The last section which issues provisions on security classified documents is 
excluded because security classified documents are not part of this study. 
Each subchapter treats its own section of the act. Every section has been analysed 
from customised information system aspect by asking the following questions: 
• Does this section have any impacts on service production?  
• Does this section have any impacts on service output?  
The analysis presented in this chapter includes the minimum content. The final 
content of data security requirements is dependent on the definition of subject-
matter and risk assessment related to that. The detailed requirements are not 
included; instead, the themes to consider are. 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Identification of tasks requiring reliability and ensuring reliability (12 §) 
The following is issued in this section: 
An information management entity shall identify the tasks whose performance requires 
special reliability from persons employed by it or acting on its behalf. The preconditions 
for carrying out a security clearance of a person are provided in the Security Clearance 
Act (726/2014). The right of an employer to acquire personal credit data on an employee 
in order to establish his or her reliability and to process data on drug use testing are 
governed by the provisions of the Act on the Protection of Privacy in Working Life 
(759/2004). (Act 906/2019 English version, 12 §.) 
To fulfil this section the authority shall identify the tasks the supplier needs to 
perform to produce the service and then analyse if they require or enable access to 
the authority’s confidential data. After that the authority needs to analyse if there is 
a need for ensuring the reliability of the supplier’s employees by performing security 
clearances of the person or by other possible means.  
Using the security clearances of the person for the supplier’s employees need to be 
set as a data security requirement. An additional requirement of keeping a book of 
all the employees who have been cleared can also be set. 
4.3.2 Data security of datasets and information systems (13 §) 
This section is the largest unity. It includes issues from different areas and has 
dependencies between them and data security. This was presented in Figure 7 in 
chapter 4.2 Defining the required security level of the subject-matter.  
According to government proposal (HE 284/2018, YKSITYISKOHTAISET PERUSTELUT 
13 § [HE 284/2018, DETAILED ARGUMENTS 13 §]), this first subsection is about risk 
management. The essential risks for both datasets and information systems shall be 
identified and analysed. On that basis, data security controls which need to be 
implemented are determined. 
An information management entity shall monitor the state of the data security of its 
operating environment and ensure the data security of its datasets and information 
systems over their entire lifecycle. The information management entity shall determine 
 
 
 
the material risks to data processing and dimension the data security measures in 
accordance with the risk assessment. (Act 906/2019 English version, 13.1 §.) 
Because the supplier is developing and perhaps maintaining the information system, 
there should be requirement for the supplier to perform risk assessment for service 
production. There should also be a requirement for regular threat modelling of the 
information system. The best results would be achieved if this were done in 
cooperation. The acquirer has the best knowledge about the operating environment 
and the substance and the supplier about the technical implementation. 
The following is provided in the second subsection: 
The resilience and operational availability of the information systems that are material 
with regard to performance of the tasks of the authorities shall be ensured with 
adequate testing on a regular basis. (Act 906/2019 English version, 13.2 §.) 
There are two issues included in this subsection. The first is about resilience and the 
second is about operational availability of the information system. According to the 
act, the only control to ensure these is regular testing. 
It is written in the government proposal (HE 284/2018, YKSITYISKOHTAISET 
PERUSTELUT 13 § [HE 284/2018, DETAILED ARGUMENTS 13 §]) that resilience shall 
be tested to verify the operational continuity and keep data security measures up to 
date. There should be a requirement for the supplier to have and maintain a 
documented continuity plan for service production which is known by the employees 
and tested. This should cover the whole service production and all processes. 
The resilience of the system needs more than regular testing. Therefore, there 
should be a requirement for the supplier to use general secure design and 
programming principles in software development of the information system. There 
can, for example, be requirement to follow OWASP Top 10 which includes both parts.  
To ensure the quality and adequacy of data security testing, it would be beneficial to 
require both manual and automated data security testing. Manual testing verifies for 
example the functionality of data security features and correctness of configurations 
and hardening controls. Automated test, again, can include a code analysis and 
vulnerability scanning and can be part of DevOps operations. When testing the 
 
 
 
resilience of the system, performance testing should also be executed. Normally this 
is not part of the data security testing, so the requirement is not usually included in 
data security requirements. 
In addition, to ensure the operational continuity of the system, there should be 
requirements for operations related to continuity. For example, there can be 
requirement for the supplier to participate in the writing of recovery plan and 
maintaining the documentation of installation, updating, recovering and removing of 
the system. 
Another issue of this subsection, operational availability, includes the requirement 
for verifying that the information system is easy to learn, its logic is easy to 
remember, and it supports user’s work tasks (HE 284/2018, YKSITYISKOHTAISET 
PERUSTELUT 13 § [HE 284/2018, DETAILED ARGUMENTS 13 §]). This is an excellent 
example of an issue affecting data security; however, it is not part of data security 
itself. This issue belongs to usability area. When the system is easy to use it reduces 
the possibility for using the system incorrectly and in that way improves the data 
security. These requirements belong to usability area and need to be included in the 
requirements specification. 
The content of the third subsection of section 13 also belongs under other area than 
pure data security even though it affects it.  
The authority shall plan the information systems, the internal structure of the 
information pools and related processing so that the publicity of documents can be 
easily implemented. (Act 906/2019 English version, 13.3 §.) 
The authority shall plan its information systems and the data structures of 
information pools so that the structure supports setting the data and documents 
easily to be either public or confidential. There can be general data security 
requirement that the system needs to support the processing and storage of both 
public and confidential data. 
  
 
 
 
The fourth subsection provides the data security in acquisitions. It can be said that 
this whole study is researching this area. 
In its acquisitions, the authority shall ensure that appropriate data security measures 
have been implemented in the information system to be acquired. (Act 906/2019 English 
version, 13.4 §.) 
When starting the acquisition, it is important that the authority carefully defines the 
subject-matter, i.e. service, assesses the risks and defines the data security 
requirements based on the both actions. As important is that the authority inspects 
and monitors the service regularly. 
The authority can also order the third party to make the security assessment. 
Sometimes there can even be requirement from legislation that the information 
system needs to be audited and approved before it can be taken into production use. 
The fifth subsection itself does not lay down provisions on auditing the system but 
refers to other legislation. 
Separate provisions are laid down on the assessment of the data security of the 
information systems and telecommunications arrangements of the authorities. (Act 
906/2019 English version, 13.5 §.) 
The authority needs to recognise the possible need for data security assessment 
when it prepares the acquisition and makes a requirement which enables to perform 
assessment by the authority itself or by the third party. The target of the assessment 
can for example be the service production processes, the service output, both or 
certain smaller part.  
4.3.3 Transfer of data in a data network (14 §) 
Section 14 lays down the provisions on data transfer through public data network. 
The following is provided in the first subsection. 
An authority shall perform the transfer of data in a public data network using an 
encrypted data transfer connection or practice if the transferred data are secret. In 
addition, the data transfer shall be arranged so that the recipient is ascertained or 
identified in a sufficiently data secure manner before the recipient is allowed to process 
the transferred secret data. (Act 906/2019 English version, 14.1 §.) 
 
 
 
When the authority starts the cooperation with the supplier, the authority should 
give instructions how the supplier should handle the confidential data of the 
authority. There should also be a requirement to the supplier for handling the 
confidential data of the authority and another requirement for informing its 
employees about the instructions and practices set by the authority. 
There can also be a requirement for the use of separate safety premises. This 
depends on tasks performed by the supplier’s employees and the confidentiality of 
data. The requirement usually includes at least the technical requirements for 
network connections, workstations, and physical security of safety premises. The 
reason for requiring safety premises can be maintenance tasks for production 
environment containing personal data. 
There should be a requirement for encrypted data transfer in data security 
requirements of the system. This should cover at least the system interfaces which 
send or receive data through public data network.  
The needed cryptography algorithms depend on data confidentiality. Finnish 
National Cyber Security Centre is maintaining a guideline on cryptographic 
requirements for confidentiality, which can be used for finding the suitable level. This 
can be set already in the data security requirements which are published in the call 
for tender or when the software development starts.  
If needed, the encryption can also be required in an internal data network. In such 
cases it needs to be observed that encryption and decryption may cause latency and 
demand processing time and capacity from the processors. The more secure 
algorithm is used, the more power it requires for encryption and decryption. 
The second subsection is about data transfer where the recipient is general public.  
Identification of the user in digital services provided to the public is governed by the Act 
on the Provision of Digital Services (306/2019). (Act 906/2019 English version, 14.2 §.) 
When the authority is defining the subject-matter, i.e. acquired information system, 
the authority needs to elicit if the system provides digital services for the public. In 
such case there will become data security requirements from the sections 5 and 6 of 
the Digital Service Act. 
 
 
 
4.3.4 Ensuring dataset security (15 §) 
This section sets provisions on ensuring dataset security and has two subsections. 
The first subsection includes a list of data security measures which the authority 
needs to follow. They are set in six paragraphs. These issues are mostly targeted at 
the authority’s operations; however, some issues may cause data security 
requirements for service production or service output. 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 15.1 §): An authority shall ensure, with the necessary 
data security measures, that: 
1) the unaltered state of its datasets has been sufficiently ensured;  
2) its datasets have been protected against technical and physical damage;  
3) the authenticity, timeliness and accuracy of its datasets have been ensured;  
4) the availability and usability of its datasets have been ensured;  
5) the availability of its datasets is restricted only if access to the information or 
processing rights have been separately restricted in the law;  
6) its datasets can be archived, as required.  
The unaltered state of datasets, issued in paragraph 1, can be partly ensured with 
logging which is treated later in this document in chapter 4.3.6 Compilation of log 
data (17 §). the measures related to identity and access management also give some 
controls for this paragraph. Identity and access management is treated in chapter 
4.3.5 Management of access rights to information systems (16 §). 
If subject-matter has data centre included, then the second paragraph will set clear 
data security requirements. In this case some of the requirements related to 
continuity issues may concern this indirectly, which were already treated in chapter 
4.3.2 Data security of datasets and information systems (13 §). 
Because of the digitalisation, the issues in paragraph 4 are essential. The authorities 
are also handling more and more the information with the information systems and 
depend on their information pools where the needed information is. Ensuring 
availability, the data security requirements are related to continuity issues. The 
usability in this paragraph means that the data is in usable form (HE 284/2018, 
 
 
 
YKSITYISKOHTAISET PERUSTELUT 15 § [HE 284/2018, DETAILED ARGUMENTS 15 §]). 
Ensuring this there can be requirement concerning the transferability of data from 
the system to another. With this requirement it can be made sure that if there is 
need for change the information system, the data can be migrated and used in the 
new system. 
The fifth paragraph sets requirements for restricting the access to data. In practice 
this is carried out with access rights. This issue is treated later in this document in the 
next chapter 4.3.5 Management of access rights to information systems (16 §). 
The last, the sixth paragraph of the first subsection lays down provisions on archiving 
the data. The principles for setting up the data security requirements for archiving 
and retaining archived data are the same as the data handled and stored in the 
information system. The new life cycle for the data is beginning, and the same 
recognition and risk assessment procedures need to be executed and corresponding 
data security requirements set.  
There is also other legislation which issues provisions on archiving. The most 
essential are the General Data Protection Regulation, i.e. GDPR ((EU) 2016/679), 
Data Protection Act (1050/2018) and Archiving Act (831/1994). The first two apply 
when the archived data includes personal data.  
The second subsection is about the physical security of the premises.  
The datasets shall be processed and stored in premises which are sufficiently secure with 
a view to implementing the requirements relating to the reliability, integrity and 
availability of datasets. (Act 906/2019 English version, 15.2 §.) 
Depending on data and its confidentiality, there can be general data security 
requirements for the supplier’s premises. They can include demands on secure areas 
or separate safety premises. The authority can also set requirements for the 
geographical location of service production. This should also include the location 
requirement of supplier’s supporting information systems used for service 
production and storing customer data and customer’s data. 
 
 
 
4.3.5 Management of access rights to information systems (16 §) 
If the data is not public, it should not be available for all. Section 16 lays down 
provisions on access rights to information systems and the management of them. 
The authority in charge of the information system shall determine the access rights to 
the information system. The access rights shall be determined in accordance with the 
needs relating to the tasks of the user and they shall be kept up-to-date. (Act 906/2019 
English version, 16 §.) 
Because the authority needs to be aware of all the persons who has access to its 
confidential data, there should be a data security requirement for the supplier to 
keep the books of all its employees who participate in the acquired service 
production and have access to confidential data of the authority. Another 
requirement should be set for the supplier to restrict the access to data from other 
employees who are not participating in the service production of the acquired 
service production. All the participating employees must have personal user IDs for 
accessing the tools and data to execute service production duties. There needs to be 
a requirement for documented process of access rights management, and all the 
access rights related to service production is to be documented. 
The authority also needs to plan and define the different user roles for the acquired 
system and how the identity and access management is implemented into system. 
These requirements are not usually data security requirements. Their 
implementation may need data security measures. 
4.3.6 Compilation of log data (17 §) 
Compilation of log data obligates the authority to gather log data from the use of 
information systems. 
An authority shall ensure that the necessary log data is compiled of the use of its 
information systems and the disclosure of information therefrom if the use of the 
information system requires identification or other login. The purpose of use of log data 
is to monitor the use of the information in the information systems and its disclosure and 
to investigate technical errors in the information system. (Act 906/2019 English version, 
17 §.) 
 
 
 
Every log must have demand. The best benefit from logs is achieved when the 
content of the log, based on the demand, is planned. This means that not all the 
information the system is producing is collected but the information is parsed and 
only the essential data is compiled to the log.  
This requires identification of logging points, i.e. defining the information on what 
needs to be logged, and planning the structure of logs. One example of log structure 
is key-value-structure, where the key provides the logging point and value is system 
log data from that point.  When the content and structure are defined carefully, 
which makes finding the needed information from logs is easier.  
The storage period of log is based on demand of use and need to be defined 
separately to every log. Therefore, the storage period can vary between different 
logs. 
The logs are needed to find out causes for technical problems or person who 
processed certain data at certain time period, i.e. audit trail. As can be seen, the 
latter includes personal data. Therefore, technical logs and audit trails need to be 
separated from each other.  
An audit trail is important because it gives legal protection to both public servant 
who has processed the data as part of his or her duty, and the citizen whose data has 
been processed. It needs to be noted, that GDPR and Data Protection Act lay down 
provisions on audit trail. 
According to normal judicial practice, log data is confidential under the Openness Act 
24.1p7 §. Therefore, access to logs, both technical and audit trail, needs to be 
restricted. The management of access right need to be planned, and access to logs 
must be based on work tasks.  
To ensure the unaltered state of logs, it is a good solution is to send the logs in real-
time to centralised logging system, which is designed and implemented to store the 
logs safely. This also lowers the risk of losing the logs for example during major 
incident of the information system which requires restoring the whole system. 
According to government proposal (HE 284/2018, YKSITYISKOHTAISET PERUSTELUT 
17 § [HE 284/2018, DETAILED ARGUMENTS 17 §]) the authority must be able to solve 
 
 
 
the disclosure of information from system and legitimate grounds for that from the 
logs. The authority must also log actions which are directed to data, such as saving, 
changing, deleting and viewing. 
To fulfil this section the authority should include a data security requirement for 
implementing logs to acquired information system. If the authority has centralised 
logging system, there can be a requirement to send system logs there. It would be 
also good to have requirement for the supplier to take part in log planning and 
writing together with the authority and maintain documentation on implemented 
logging. The supplier should also be required to log its own service production 
systems.  
4.3.7 The removal of protection levels 
Before the current Information Management Act the it was possible to classify the 
confidential data with protection level, PL. Protection level classification was used to 
protect personal data and it had four levels. Information Security Decree sets direct 
requirements how to protect data on which protection level. Now that protection 
levels are removed, also the related requirements are removed, which can cause 
confusion. 
It needs to be remembered that even though the protection levels are removed from 
the legislation, the basis for data protection is not removed, and the principles are 
the same. The data must still be protected as before.  
When the authority is defining the subject-matter, it analyses the need for data 
protection in the same way that it previously analysed the need for classification of 
the data with protection levels. Now the measures are not derived from legislation 
according to protection level but the authority itself sets the needed measures to 
fulfil the authority’s own data security standard. The authority can still use the same 
measures but needs to avoid using term protection level anymore.  
 
 
 
4.4 Information Management Act vs. Information Security Decree 
One part of the study was to compare the current Information Management Act with 
repealed Information Security Decree. The aim for that was to solve if the content of 
data security requirements in use was still usable in case of correspondences.  
The comparison was made by comparing the current act against the repealed decree. 
Even the partial correspondences were accepted and listed. The results are 
presented in Table 3 below.  
Here is guidance of the used reference methods in the Table 3. The marking § 12 
refers to the whole section. The marking § 13.1 refers to the first subsection of 
section 13 whereas § 13.2 to the second subsection of the same section. Marking § 
5.1p1 refers to the first paragraph under the first subsection of section 5 whereas § 
5.1p2 refers to the second paragraph under the first subsection of section 5.  
The content of the sections, subsections, and paragraphs in Table 3 is from the 
English translations of the Information Management Act and the Information Security 
Decree. They can be found in Finlex service. However, the comparison work was 
carried out with Finnish versions. 
Table 3. Comparison between the Information Management Act and the Information 
Security Decree. 
Information Management Act Information Security Decree 
§ 12 
An information management entity shall 
identify the tasks whose performance 
requires special reliability from persons 
employed by it or acting on its behalf. The 
preconditions for carrying out a security 
clearance of a person are provided in the 
Security Clearance Act (726/2014). The right 
of an employer to acquire personal credit 
data on an employee in order to establish 
his or her reliability and to process data on 
drug use testing are governed by the 
provisions of the Act on the Protection of 
Privacy in Working Life (759/2004). 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 12 §.) 
§ 5.1 
In order to implement information security, 
a central government authority shall 
ensure that 
p3 the duties and responsibilities related to 
the handling of documents are defined; 
p8 the reliability of personnel and other 
persons performing tasks related to the 
handling of documents is ensured, if 
necessary, by means of a security clearance 
procedure and other means available by 
virtue of law; 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 5 §.) 
  
 
 
 
§ 13.1 
An information management entity shall 
monitor the state of the data security of its 
operating environment and ensure the data 
security of its datasets and information 
systems over their entire lifecycle. The 
information management entity shall 
determine the material risks to data 
processing and dimension the data security 
measures in accordance with the risk 
assessment. 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 13 §.) 
§ 5.1 
In order to implement information security, 
a central government authority shall 
ensure that 
p1 any information security risks connected 
with the activities of the central 
government authority are identified; 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 5 §.) 
§ 6 
Information security measures shall be 
planned and implemented so that they 
cover all stages of handling a document, 
ranging from the preparation or reception 
of the document to the filing or destruction 
thereof, including the provision and transfer 
of the document and the supervision of the 
handling. In the planning, compliance with 
data processing obligations shall be ensured 
also when data processing tasks are carried 
out on commission of central government 
authorities. 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 6 §.) 
§ 13.2 
The resilience and operational availability of 
the information systems that are material 
with regard to performance of the tasks of 
the authorities shall be ensured with 
adequate testing on a regular basis 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 13 §.) 
 
§ 13.3 
The authority shall plan the information 
systems, the internal structure of the 
information pools and related processing so 
that the publicity of documents can be 
easily implemented. 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 13 §.) 
§ 4 
A central government authority shall ensure 
that its planning of information security 
pursuant to good practice on information 
management is based on inquiries and 
assessments conducted by it regarding 
documents in its possession and the 
significance of their contents, that the 
planning is conducted with account of the 
requirement to ensure good publicity and 
secrecy structures in information systems, 
and that the information security measures 
are geared with consideration of the 
significance and purpose of use of the 
information to be protected, of the threats 
against the documents and the information 
systems, and of the costs for the 
information security measures. 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 4 §.) 
  
 
 
 
§ 13.4 
In its acquisitions, the authority shall ensure 
that appropriate data security measures 
have been implemented in the information 
system to be acquired. 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 13 §.) 
§ 4 
A central government authority shall ensure 
that its planning of information security 
pursuant to good practice on information 
management is based on inquiries and 
assessments conducted by it regarding 
documents in its possession and the 
significance of their contents, that the 
planning is conducted with account of the 
requirement to ensure good publicity and 
secrecy structures in information systems, 
and that the information security measures 
are geared with consideration of the 
significance and purpose of use of the 
information to be protected, of the threats 
against the documents and the information 
systems, and of the costs for the 
information security measures. 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 4 §.) 
 
§ 13.5 
Separate provisions are laid down on the 
assessment of the data security of the 
information systems and 
telecommunications arrangements of the 
authorities 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 13 §.) 
 
§ 14.1 
An authority shall perform the transfer of 
data in a public data network using an 
encrypted data transfer connection or 
practice if the transferred data are secret. In 
addition, the data transfer shall be 
arranged so that the recipient is ascertained 
or identified in a sufficiently data secure 
manner before the recipient is allowed to 
process the transferred secret data. 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 14 §.) 
 
§ 14.2 
Identification of the user in digital services 
provided to the public is governed by the 
Act on the 
Provision of Digital Services (306/2019). 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 14 §.) 
 
§ 15.1 
An authority shall ensure, with the 
necessary data security measures, that: 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 15 §.) 
 
  
 
 
 
§ 15.1p1 
the unaltered state of its datasets has been 
sufficiently ensured; 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 15 §.) 
§ 5.1 
In order to implement information security, 
a central government authority shall 
ensure that 
p6 unauthorised modification and other 
unauthorised or inappropriate processing of 
information is prevented by access rights 
management, access monitoring, and 
appropriate and sufficient security 
arrangements concerning information 
networks, information systems and 
information services; 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 5 §.) 
§ 15.1p2 
its datasets have been protected against 
technical and physical damage; 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 15 §.) 
 
§ 15.1p3 
the authenticity, timeliness and accuracy of 
its datasets have been ensured; 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 15 §.) 
 
§ 15.1p4 
the availability and usability of its datasets 
have been ensured; 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 15 §.) 
§ 5.1 
In order to implement information security, 
a central government authority shall 
ensure that 
p4 access to and availability of information 
in different situations are safeguarded, […]; 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 5 §.) 
§ 15.1p5 
the availability of its datasets is restricted 
only if access to the information or 
processing rights have been separately 
restricted in the law; 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 15 §.) 
§ 5.1 
In order to implement information security, 
a central government authority shall 
ensure that 
p5 the secrecy and other protection of 
documents and the information contained 
therein are safeguarded by granting access 
to documents only to those who need secret 
information or personal data recorded in a 
personal data file for performing their work 
duties; 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 5 §.) 
§ 15.1p6 
its datasets can be archived, as required. 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 15 §.) 
§ 6 
Information security measures shall be 
planned and implemented so that they 
cover all stages of handling a document, 
ranging from the preparation or reception 
of the document to the filing […]. 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 6 §.) 
  
 
 
 
§ 15.2 
The datasets shall be processed and stored 
in premises which are sufficiently secure 
with a view to implementing the 
requirements relating to the reliability, 
integrity and availability of datasets. 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 15 §.) 
§ 5.1 
In order to implement information security, 
a central government authority shall 
ensure that 
p7 the premises for data processing and 
storage of documents are sufficiently 
monitored and protected; 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 5 §.) 
§ 16 
The authority in charge of the information 
system shall determine the access rights to 
the information system. The access rights 
shall be determined in accordance with the 
needs relating to the tasks of the user and 
they shall be kept up-to-date 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 16 §.) 
§ 5.1 
In order to implement information security, 
a central government authority shall 
ensure that 
p3 the duties and responsibilities related to 
the handling of documents are defined; 
p5 the secrecy and other protection of 
documents and the information contained 
therein are safeguarded by granting access 
to documents only to those who need secret 
information or personal data recorded in a 
personal data file for performing their work 
duties; 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 5 §.) 
§ 17 
An authority shall ensure that the necessary 
log data is compiled of the use of its 
information systems and the disclosure of 
information therefrom if the use of the 
information system requires identification 
or other login. The purpose of use of log 
data is to monitor the use of the 
information in the information systems and 
its disclosure and to investigate technical 
errors in the information system. 
(Act 906/2019 English version, 17 §.) 
In § 5.1p6 of the decree it is mentioned 
access monitoring.  
Otherwise the paragraph in question does 
not comply with the § 17 of the act. 
(Decree 681/2010 English version, 5 §.) 
 
This comparison work showed that the current act has largely the same content as 
the repealed decree. There are also some issues which are laid down only in the 
current act. As a result of this comparison, it could be said some decree-based 
requirements can be used and modified with the current act if they otherwise fulfil 
the criteria of unambiguous requirements. This requires grouping according to the 
current act and deeper analysis. 
  
 
 
 
4.5 Renewal of requirements 
The last issue of this study was to design a template for single data security 
requirement based on the research results. Then, by using the template and 
concurrent requirements, new data security requirements are to be written which 
also fulfils the obligations of the current legislation.   
4.5.1 Template for single requirement 
The criteria for the template were derived from the principles of good requirement 
presented in chapter 3.2 Requirements engineering and the operation model in the 
Legal Register Centre. The Legal Register Centre uses so called minimum requirement 
set which is maintained by the information security team. The content is based on 
legislation, the template does not need information about author or rationale. The 
version of the requirements is the version of requirements document. Therefore, a 
single requirement does not need version information.  
Because the data security requirements are part of the call for tender, they should be 
consistent and unambiguous. Even though the supplier has the possibility to ask 
questions during the procurement process, the template should support the 
linguistic quality and writing measurable requirements. 
The template is presented in Figure 8. The template includes guidance written 
following the same method than is required for writing the single requirement.  
 
 
 
  
Figure 8. Requirement template with descriptions. 
 
The template consists of three mandatory fields: title, description and verification 
and all of them need to be filled. The requirement shall be written in active form and 
obligations addressed by using the verb ‘shall’. The use of immeasurable words, e.g. 
‘sufficient’, ‘appropriate’, ‘essential’ and ‘necessary’, shall be avoided. All obligations 
shall have own verification conditions.  
  
<Requirement ID> <Short description of requirement> 
When writing a requirement, the authority shall fill all three fields in this template: the 
title, description and verification. 
The title of the requirement consists of unique requirement ID and the short description 
of the requirement. The authority shall add the requirement ID and write the description 
using active form. The use of passive form is prohibited because it does not tell who is 
responsible for fulfilling the requirement. 
This second field shall contain the full description of the requirement. Authority shall 
write the full description using active form and use the verb ‘shall’ to address obligatory 
content. The authority can use descriptive text to explain the obligation.  
The authority can also give goals or preferences with ‘should’ verb and allowances or 
suggestion with ‘may’ verb. They are not obligations. 
The verification shall contain verification conditions for all obligations addressed in 
description field.  
The requirement is acceptable when the writer has filled all three fields of template. 
The title of data security requirement is acceptable if it has both requirement ID and short 
description. The ID shall be unique and short description written in active form. 
The full description is acceptable if it uses active form and addresses the obligatory 
content with the ‘shall’ verb.  
The verification is acceptable when it contains verification conditions for all obligations 
addressed in this description field. 
 
 
 
 
4.5.2 Renewal work 
In the Legal Register Centre the data security requirements are in the appendix of a 
secure agreement. The purpose of the secure agreement is to agree on safety 
arrangements, confidentiality, data protection and data security. This model 
remained in new model. 
The Secure agreement includes contractual security issues in following areas: sub-
contracting, confidentiality and obligation of secrecy, data protection, administrative 
and physical security, administration of information systems, software security, 
continuity, security clearances, auditing, and reporting and communication. 
Concurrent requirements and security agreement included a large number of 
overlapping requirements, especially in confidentiality and administrative security 
areas. Many of the overlapping requirements were more contractual issues in nature 
than pure requirements. Therefore, they were removed from requirements and left 
as part of the agreement. 
The requirements in technical and software development areas were list of singular 
requirements and did not have cohesion. In other words, they did not guide the 
supplier to implement built-in security but rather add-on security. The software 
development was not seen as a combination of design, development, testing, 
deployment and maintenance. 
The renewal work lowered the number from over 100 requirements to less than 15 
requirements. The reason for this was the removal of overlapping contractual issues. 
The other reason for decrease was grouping. Previously, there was a bunch of single 
requirements with same or nearly same goal. These requirements were grouped and 
joined. 
New data security requirements have data security requirements for general service 
production work which are related to administrative security. The other part covers 
the information system and software development. The most significant change in 
this part was the change from add-on security thinking to built-in security thinking. 
This change added the requirements to follow OWASP Top 10 and OWASP API 
Security Top 10 principles and perform both manual and automated data security 
testing based on OWASP Application Security Verification Standard. They can be 
 
 
 
followed because the user interfaces of information systems are mostly browser 
based. 
5 Conclusions 
This thesis studied how the change in legislation laying the provisions in information 
security and imposing obligations for public administration, affected information 
security requirements in public IT procurements. The work was assigned by the Legal 
Register Centre in Hämeenlinna which organises the development and maintenance 
of information systems under the Ministry of Justice and arranges public IT 
procurements. 
The results showed that the issues in legislation have remained quite similar. This 
new act has only a few completely new issues in it compared to the content of 
repealed decree. The biggest change is in the way of defining the security level for 
the subject-matter of acquired IT service. Previously, the authorities had the 
possibility to classify the data to certain protection level and then define the 
requirements from the decree.  
Now when the protection levels are removed, the authorities must define the level 
and related requirements by themselves according to current legislation and by using 
risk-based method. Even though the current method might seem totally new, it is 
based on the same principles as the previous method: the data needs to be 
protected according to its content, and the protective measures are selected based 
on that. It seems that the new method is more flexible, and the authorities can apply 
it more freely to meet their own needs. 
The results of the study also showed how important it is to understand the structure 
of subject-matter when setting up the information security requirements. The 
subject-matter can be seen as a service which consists of service production and 
service product issues. The service product in this study, the customised information 
system, must meet the obligations issued in legislations. This leads to the situation 
that the service production, software development work and related management 
and control work, must meet the same obligations too. The nature of these two 
issues is different so the aspect of information security requirements is also different. 
 
 
 
Because the requirements are published as a part of the call for tender, this must be 
taken into account when defining the subject-matter. 
Another aspect of the thesis was to study characteristics of good requirement. Based 
on past procurements it seemed that some requirements were ambiguous, the 
number of requirements was high, and requirements did not fit to subject-matter.  
The results showed that information security requirements should be measurable 
and linguistically clear. Because the requirements are part of call for tender, the 
suppliers make the decision to tender based on them. If suppliers do not understand 
the obligations, it is a high risk for them to tender. If an acquirer does not understand 
obligations, how can it monitor fulfilment? Clear and consistent information security 
requirements help both parties to understand the obligations.  
The content of requirements specification needs to be customised case by case even 
it is possible to have ready sets of requirements. To do that, the content of subject-
matter needs to be fully understood. As it can be seen, the themes in this thesis 
correlate with each other. 
6 Discussion 
The need for this thesis came from a change in legislation. The effects on IT 
procurements were not known and they needed to be evaluated. Because the Legal 
Register Centre has continually ongoing IT procurements, the impacts needed to be 
known as soon as possible.  
The schedule of this thesis was moved forward because the legislative drafting 
process was constantly delayed. The first target to enter the new act into force was 
March 2018. Finally, this was on 1 January 2020. The enactment of the act was done 
in August 2019; hence, the study could be started after that. 
The subject for the thesis was information security requirements of the IT 
procurements. As it is known the concept of IT is wide. Therefore, this study started 
with pre-study. The purpose for that pre-study was to find what kind of IT 
procurements were the majority group in the last two years, how was the subject-
matter and what tendering procedures were used in the procurements. The study 
 
 
 
helped to find the most important target group from the IT procurement point of 
view and set constraints to the thesis. 
The results of the pre-study showed that most subject-matters were customised 
information systems at basic level and did not include data centre services. The trend 
in tendering procedures was the use of negotiated procedure. 
The pre-study also showed that many suppliers had asked questions concerning the 
content and suitability of concurrent information security requirements. This 
observation led to include the structure and language of requirements as a part of 
the thesis as well. 
The actual study started by gathering the information about public procurements 
and tendering procedures. This strengthened the assumption about the importance 
of content in requirements. Public procurements are strictly regulated; changing the 
content of procurement is not possible, even though the negotiated procedure 
allows some adjustment up to a certain point of procedure. 
Next the structure of subject-matter was studied. As the pre-study showed, there 
had been comments and questions concerning the suitability of information security 
requirements compared to the content of subject-matter. An analysis of concurrent 
requirements showed that requirements were general, rather “one size fits all” than 
customised to a certain procurement.  
One of the pain points were the responsibilities. It was possible to interpret some 
requirements so that they were not obligatory. Even though the compliance with key 
principles of procurement process, i.e. equitableness, non-discrimination, and 
transparency, restricts to definition of subject-matter, it still should be possible to 
define what services and with what kind of responsibilities it will be acquired.  
Dividing the acquired service into two categories, service production and service 
output, helped in the next phase, the actual interpretation of law. The act has been 
written to support authorities to accomplish their duties. In other words, the 
connection between the act and acquired service is not clear. The act also treats the 
big picture of information security, and therefore it has dependencies to other areas 
 
 
 
than information security. This means that information security obligations in 
legislation also affects other areas.  
The analysis of the act against the service production and service output helped with 
the comparison work between the new act and the previous decree. This comparison 
was carried out to find out if there is a possibility to use the concurrent requirements 
or if the change in legislation needs more extensive renewal. The results showed that 
even though the new legislation had some completely new issues, some of the 
content and obligations would be comparable with the previous legislation and the 
content of previous requirements could be used. 
The final part of this thesis was to create a suitable template for a single 
requirement. Then, based on the research and analysis, information security 
requirements used in IT procurements were renewed by using this new template. 
The main observations during this part were the overlapping between the security 
agreement and concurrent information security requirements and the lack of 
cohesion in concurrent software development requirements, which led to add-on 
security thinking instead of built-in security thinking. 
The significance of this thesis to the Legal Register Centre was big. The Legal Register 
Centre is responsible for the development and maintenance of the information 
systems under the Ministry of Justice and therefore it accomplishes public IT 
procurements constantly. There were no official recommendations for authorities 
available to guide the enforcement of new legislation at the time it became 
obligatory. Therefore, the notability of this thesis was emphasised by the assigner of 
this thesis. The first recommendations were published in April 2020. 
At the time of writing this thesis, the updated information security requirements 
have already been a part of at least four IT procurements arranged by the Legal 
Register Centre. Some of them are already completed and the work has already 
started, and some of them are under definition phase.  
The first experience of the use the requirements has been encouraging. Many 
stakeholders have found the new model clear, with the title, description and 
verification instructions. Also, the lesser number of requirements has been found 
positive.  
 
 
 
This model has been presented cross-administratively in central government. Some 
agencies have already taken the model into use. 
Even though the start for this model has been encouraging, the model is not ready 
yet. Most of the persons defining the subject-matter has no knowledge about 
information security. Therefore, this model should be developed to better guide and 
support these persons in their definition work and to find the dependencies to 
information security. Guidance and procedures should also be developed to help the 
customer, i.e. the authority, to monitor if service development and service output 
are fulfilling the obligations set in information management requirements even 
though they now include verification instructions.  
Additionally, the requirements cover now only a customised information system. 
There is need to add other parts as well. More and more suppliers are moving their 
services from data centres to cloud environment so this might be the next big target 
for development. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Supporting questions  
This appendix includes examples of supporting questions. They can be used for 
eliciting the information security related needs which can then, after analysis, be 
written as information security requirements. The list is not supposed to be 
exhaustive. The meanings of the questions are also shortly explained later. 
1. How critical the information system is? How long is it possible to operate without it?  
2. What kind of data it is stored and processed in the information system? 
a. Public data 
b. Confidential data 
c. Personal data 
3. In what geographical location the data of the information system can be located? 
a. Only in Finland 
b. Only in EU (European Union) 
c. In EU and EEA (European Economic Area) 
d. In EU, EEA and third countries under GDPR 
4. What kind of tasks the supplier is performing? What are the supplier’s roles in 
service production? 
5. Does the supplier get access to the authority’s confidential data related to 
information system and its development or similar? 
a. Any requirements for premises, network connections or equipment? 
b. Any requirements for storing confidential data? 
6. Does the supplier get access to productive environment?  
a. What kind of tasks the supplier is performing there? In what roles?  
b. Are separate safety premises required to perform these tasks? Requirements 
for network connections or for equipment? Other? 
7. In what geographical location the supplier can produce service? Includes the location 
of supplier’s supporting systems for service production and data in them. 
a. Only in Finland 
b. Only in EU  
c. In EU and EEA  
d. In EU, EEA and third countries under GDPR 
8. Does the information system offer digital service for citizens? 
a. What kind of data can be accessed, public or confidential? 
b. Does the service require login? 
c. Does the citizen have a possibility to send files to system via service? 
9. Does the information system have integrations to other information systems? 
a. Does the traffic between the systems go through public network or internal 
network? 
b. Does the target system belong to own organisation or other organisation? 
c. Is target system sender or receiver? 
d. What kind of data is sent/received? 
e. Is the classification of data in the same level in both systems? 
 
 
 
 
Question 1 helps to analyse the level of continuity. More critical the system is more 
carefully the continuity and related measures, for example mirroring the system and 
requirement to test restoring, need to be planned. 
Question 2 helps to identify what kind of data is stored and processed in system. It 
needs to be noted that security classified data (national and international) is missing 
from the list. Personal data which is used in criminal matters and in connection with 
maintaining national security is missing too. 
Question 3 is related to question 2. The possible geographical location of data is 
related to the content and classification of data. 
Questions 4-7 help to identify the need to require possible security clearances for 
employees of the supplier. It is dependent on the roles and tasks of the employees 
and the data they have access. These issues can also set requirements for premises, 
data network and connections, equipment and geographical location of service 
production and its supporting systems. 
Question 8 is for digital services. The information system measures are dependent on 
the service and the data and its classification. For example, if there is possibility to 
send files, there needs to be protection against malware and if the citizen has access 
to his or her personal data the identification must be strong enough. 
Question 9 helps to identify if there are any integration to other systems and for 
whom they belong. Depending on data and network it can set need for encryption 
and protection against malware. There might be also need for identification of 
system with certificates. If the classification of systems differs there might be a need 
to use boundary protection service. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Information security requirements (in Finnish) 
 
Toimittaja sitoutuu täyttämään kaikki tämän asiakirjan vaatimukset. Tilaajalla on 
oikeus auditoida palvelu itse tai kolmannen osapuolen toimesta. 
1. Palvelun tuottamiseen liittyvät tietoturvallisuusvaatimukset 
Mikäli muuta ei mainita, Toimittajan tulee suorittaa tässä luvussa kuvatut 
toimenpiteet, jotka kohdistuvat hankinnan kohteen palvelun tuottamiseen, 
jäljempänä ’palvelu’.  
Toimittaja laatii tässä luvussa vaaditut kirjalliset kuvaukset sopimuskauden alussa.  
Toimittaja laatii ja toimittaa tässä luvussa vaaditut raportit Tilaajan ja Toimittajan 
yhdessä, sopimuskauden alussa sovittujen käytänteiden mukaisesti, mikäli 
yksittäisessä vaatimuksessa ei toisin sanota. 
1.1 Toimittaja kuvaa kirjallisesti palvelun turvallisuusperiaatteet ja 
nimeää palvelun vastuuhenkilöt. 
Toimittaja kuvaa kirjallisesti turvallisuusperiaatteet, joita Toimittaja noudattaa 
tuottaessa palvelua ja käsitellessään palveluun liittyvää tietoa. 
Turvallisuusperiaatteissa on huomioitava palveluun ja sen jatkuvuuteen oleellisesti 
vaikuttavat sisäiset ja ulkoiset tekijät. Turvallisuusperiaatteiden tulee kattaa kaikki 
palvelun osa-alueet ja täyttää Tilaajan vaatima taso. 
Lisäksi Toimittaja kuvaa turvallisuusperiaatteissa palvelun tietoturvallisuuden, 
jatkuvuuden ja tietosuojan seuraamiseen ja kehittämiseen liittyvät tehtävät ja roolit 
sekä niiden vastuut.  Toimittaja nimeää näihin rooleihin vastuu- ja varahenkilöt. 
Turvallisuusperiaatedokumentin toteutus- ja tallennusmuoto sovitaan yhteisesti 
sopimuskauden alussa. Toimittaja hyväksyttää tietoturvamenettelyn Tilaajalla. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että sopimuskauden alussa Toimittaja kuvaa 
kirjallisesti palvelun turvallisuusperiaatteet ja toimittaa Tilaajalle hyväksyttäväksi. 
Hyväksymisestä on hyväksymismerkinnät yhteisesti sovitulla tavalla.  
Lisäksi Toimittaja varmistaa, että Tilaajalla on ajantasainen lista vastuuhenkilöistä ja 
heidän varahenkilöistään. 
 
  
 
 
 
1.2 Toimittaja valvoo ja parantaa palvelun tuottamisen 
tietoturvallisuutta. 
Toimittaja valvoo jatkuvasti, että palvelun tuottamisessa noudatetaan 
tietoturvallisuudesta annettuja ohjeita ja puuttuu välittömästi havaitsemiinsa tai sen 
tietoon tulleisiin poikkeamiin ja kirjaa ne. 
Toimittajan tulee myös jatkuvasti seurata mahdollisia muutoksia 
tietoturvallisuuskentällä sekä arvioida muutosten vaikutusta palvelun 
turvallisuusperiaatteiden kattavuuteen ja riittävyyteen, jotta Toimittaja pystyy 
ylläpitämään sovitun turvallisuustason. Toimittajan tulee tarvittaessa ryhtyä 
arvioinnin perusteella korjaaviin toimenpiteisiin omalla kustannuksellaan. Mikäli 
joistakin toimenpiteistä aiheutuu kustannuksia Tilaajalle, Toimittajan tulee 
hyväksyttää ne Tilaajalla erikseen. Arviointitulokset ja muutostoimenpiteet tulee 
dokumentoida.  
Lisäksi Toimittaja ja Tilaaja kokoontuvat säännöllisesti arvioimaan yhdessä palvelun 
tietoturvallisuuteen tilannetta ja palveluun liittyviä tietoturvallisuusriskejä. Samalla 
osapuolet sopivat yhteisesti arvioinnin tulosten perusteella suoritettavista 
kehittämistoimenpiteistä ja sopivat vastuutahot. Osapuolet sopivat myös 
mahdollisesta kustannusten jakamisesta. Lisäksi osapuolet seuraavat aiemmin 
sovittujen toimenpiteiden edistymistä. 
Tilaaja ja Toimittaja sopivat säännöllisistä kokoontumisista ja niiden tarkemmista 
sisällöistä yhteisesti sopimuskauden alussa. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Toimittaja pystyy pyydettäessä osoittamaan, että 
henkilöstölle on annettu palvelun tuottamisen liittyvää tietoturvallisuusohjeistusta ja 
että Toimittaja valvoo ohjeiden noudattamista ja kirjaa havaitut ja ilmoitetut 
poikkeamat. 
Toimittaja esittää Tilaajalle säännöllisesti, kuitenkin vähintään kerran vuodessa, 
palveluun liittyvän tietoturvallisuuden arvioinnin tulokset ja sen perusteella esiin 
nousseet ja tehdyt kehittämis- ja korjaustoimenpiteet. 
Lisäksi Toimittaja osallistuu yhteistyössä Tilaajan kanssa palveluun liittyvien 
tietoturvallisuusriskien arviointiin yhdessä sovitun mukaisesti. 
 
  
 
 
 
1.3 Toimittaja vastaa, että palvelun tuottamiseen osallistuva henkilöstö 
on koulutettu tehtäviinsä. 
Toimittaja vastaa siitä, että palvelun tuottamiseen osallistuva henkilöstö on 
koulutettu rooliensa mukaisiin tehtäviinsä.  
Toimittaja kouluttaa palvelun tuottamiseen osallistuvaa henkilöstöä säännöllisesti 
myös tietoturvallisuuden ja tietosuojan sekä niihin liittyvien ajantasaisten 
käytäntöjen osalta, jotta palvelun tuottamisen tietoturvallisuuden taso pysyy 
vähintään Tilaajan määrittämällä tasolla. 
Toimittajan tulee kehittää ja ylläpitää palvelun tuottamiseen osallistuvan 
henkilöstön osaamista, jotta palvelun taso pysyy vähintään sovitulla tasolla.  
Tilaaja sitoutuu ilmoittamaan Toimittajalle välittömästi, mikäli palvelun kohteeseen 
liittyvä lainsäädäntö, ohjeet tai käytännöt muuttuvat. Toimittaja sitoutuu 
tiedottamaan edellä mainituista Tilaajan ilmoittamista muutoksesta palvelun 
tuottamisesta vastaavalle henkilöstölleen sekä alihankkijoilleen palvelun 
tuottamisen edellyttämässä laajuudessa. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, Toimittaja pystyy osoittamaan palvelun tuottamiseen 
osallistuvan henkilöstön kouluttamisen. 
Lisäksi Toimittaja pystyy tarvittaessa osoittamaan, että on tiedottanut henkilöstöä ja 
tarvittaessa alihankkijoita muuttuneista ohjeista ja käytännöistä sekä palvelua  
koskevan lainsäädännön muuttumisesta. 
 
  
 
 
 
1.4 Toimittaja reagoi palveluun kohdistuviin turvallisuushäiriöihin 
viivytyksettä ja raportoi niistä Tilaajalle. 
Turvallisuushäiriöillä tarkoitetaan tässä kaikkia palvelun turvallisuuteen liittyviä 
häiriöitä ja niihin sisältyvät myös tietoturvaan ja tietosuojaan sisältyvät häiriöt ja 
poikkeamat. 
Toimittajalla on menettelytavat palveluun kohdistuvien turvallisuushäiriöiden 
käsittelyyn ja raportointiin. Toimittaja on myös nimennyt henkilöt 
turvallisuushäiriöiden hallintaan. 
Toimittaja on myös määritellyt selkeät menettelyt turvallisuushäiriöiden 
ilmoittamiseen ja on ohjeistanut ja kouluttanut ne palvelun tuottamiseen 
osallistuvalle henkilöstölle.  
Menettely huolehtii myös siitä, että palveluun liittyvien sähköisten viestien, 
sähköpostien, tunnistamistietojen sekä paikkatietojen luottamuksellisuudesta ja 
oikeasta käsittelystä myös tietoturvapoikkeamatilanteita selvitettäessä 
Toimittaja reagoi tietoturvapoikkeamiin viivytyksettä ja ryhtyy niiden johdosta 
tarvittaviin toimenpiteisiin. Toimittaja pitää kirjaa tietoturvapoikkeamista ja raportoi 
ne Tilaajalle. 
Hankinnan kohteeseen liittyvien henkilötietojen vaarantuminen on aina vakava 
poikkeama, josta Toimittajan on ilmoitettava Tilaajalle viivytyksettä. 
Toimittaja huolehtii myös siitä, että hankinnan kohteen tuottamiseen osallistuva 
henkilöstö tietää, kenelle hankinnan kohteeseen kohdistuvista 
tietoturvapoikkeamista ja -tapahtumista tai niiden uhkista tulee ilmoittaa. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Toimittaja pystyy pyynnöstä esittämään 
menettelyn palveluun liittyvien turvallisuushäiriöiden käsittelyyn ja raportointiin ja 
että sitä noudatetaan palvelun tuottamisessa.  
Lisäksi Toimittaja pystyy tarvittaessa osoittamaan, että se on tiedottanut palvelun 
tuottamiseen osallistuvaa henkilöstöä siitä, kenelle turvallisuushäiriöistä tai niiden 
uhista tulee ilmoittaa. 
Toimittaja raportoi turvallisuushäiriöistä Tilaajalle. 
 
  
 
 
 
1.5 Toimittaja vastaa luottamuksellisen ja salassa pidettävän aineiston 
tietoturvasta ja tietosuojasta aineiston koko elinkaaren ajan. 
Toimittaja antaa palveluun liittyvän luottamuksellisen ja salassa pidettävän aineiston 
vain niiden henkilöiden saataville, jotka tarvitsevat sitä palvelun tuottamisessa, ja 
jotka täyttävät Turvallisuussopimuksessa mainitut edellytykset salassa pidettävän 
aineiston käsittelyyn.  
Toimittaja huolehtii myös, että kyseiset henkilöt tietävät, miten aineistoa koskevasta 
tietoturvallisuudesta ja tietosuojasta huolehditaan aineiston koko elinkaaren ajan. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Toimittaja ylläpitää luetteloa palveluun liittyvää 
salassa pidettävää tietoa käsittelevistä henkilöistä ja pystyy pyynnöstä esittämään 
luettelon. 
Lisäksi Toimittaja pystyy osoittamaan, että on ohjeistanut kyseiset henkilöt 
huolehtimaan luottamuksellisen ja salassa pidettävän aineiston tietoturvallisuudesta 
ja tietosuojasta aineiston koko elinkaaren ajan. 
 
  
 
 
 
1.6 Toimittaja huolehtii vastuullaan olevista palvelun tuottamiseen 
käytettävistä ICT-resursseista ja niiden tietoturvallisuudesta. 
Toimittaja organisoi ja vastuuttaa vastuullaan olevien palvelun tuottamiseen 
käytettävien ja liittyvien fyysisten ja virtuaalisten laitteiden, tietojärjestelmien, 
palveluiden ja ohjelmistojen luetteloinnin ja kuvausten laadinnan sekä em. 
luetteloiden ja kuvausten ylläpidon. 
Kuvauksissa tulee ilmetä myös edellä mainittuihin ICT-resursseihin mahdollisesti 
liittyvät yhteydet julkiseen tietoverkkoon (Internet) ja mitä tietoja näiden yhteyksien 
kautta toimitetaan. Lisäksi kuvauksista tulee ilmetä, missä maantieteellisissä 
sijainneissa tallennettu tieto sijaitsee, koskien myös mahdollisia pilvipalveluita. 
Toimittaja luetteloi myös palvelun tuottamiseen käytettävät ohjelmisto- ym. 
lisenssit, ja ylläpitää luetteloa. 
Lisäksi Toimittaja organisoi ja vastuuttaa edellä mainittujen ICT-resurssien päivitys- 
ja muutostarpeiden seurannan, päivityspäätösten teon ja päivitysten asennuksen 
erityisesti tietoturvapäivitysten osalta. 
Toimittaja raportoi edellä mainittujen vastuullaan olevien ICT-resurssien ja niiden 
hallinnan tietoturvallisuuden tilasta Tilaajalle säännöllisesti, vähintään kerran 
vuodessa. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Toimittaja pystyy osoittamaan, että on 
organisoinut ja vastuuttanut vastuullaan olevien palvelun tuottamiseen käytettävien 
ICT-resurssien luetteloinnin ja kuvausten laadinnan, ja pystyy pyydettäessä 
toimittamaan luettelot ja kuvaukset. 
Lisäksi Toimittaja pystyy todentamaan, että edellä mainittujen ICT-resurssien 
päivitys- ja muutostarpeita seurataan. 
Toimittaja raportoi Tilaajalle vaatimuksen mukaisesti säännöllisesti, vähintään 
kerran vuodessa 
 
  
 
 
 
2. Palvelun tuloksena olevan tietojärjestelmään ja sen kehittämiseen 
liittyvät tietoturvallisuusvaatimukset 
Tietojärjestelmän tulee täyttää tässä luvussa olevat sovelluskehityksessä 
huomioitavat tietoturvavaatimukset. 
Tietojärjestelmässä tulee voida käsitellä sekä henkilötietoja että salassa pidettävää 
aineistoa. 
2.1 Toimittaja suunnittelee ja kehittää verkkosovelluksen ajantasaisia 
tietoturvakäytänteitä noudattaen. 
Toimittaja suunnittelee ja toteuttaa verkkosovelluksen ajantasaisia OWASP Top 10 -
käytänteitä noudattaen. Käytänteet on listattu liitteessä 
Liite_X_OWASP_Top_10_2017.pdf. Liite on englanninkielinen.  
Toimittaja suunnittelee ja toteuttaa verkkosovelluksen ulospäin näkyvät rajapinnat 
ajantasaisia OWASP API Top 10 -käytänteitä noudattaen. Käytänteet on listattu 
liitteessä Liite_Y_OWASP_API_Security_Top_10_2019.pdf. Liite on englanninkielinen. 
Liitteen X lähde: https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP_Top_10-
2017_%28en%29.pdf.pdf (viitattu 14.11.2019). 
Liitteen Y lähde: https://github.com/OWASP/API-
Security/raw/master/2019/en/dist/owasp-api-security-top-10.pdf (viitattu 1.4.2020). 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Toimittaja pystyy pyydettäessä esittämään liitteissä 
kuvattujen tietoturvakäytänteiden huomioimisen koko sovelluskehittämisen 
toteutusketjussa suunnittelusta testaukseen ja verkkosovelluksen julkaisuun.  
 
  
 
 
 
2.2 Toimittaja laatii tietotojärjestelmän lokitussuunnitelman ja toteuttaa 
lokituksen sen mukaisesti. 
Toimittaja laatii tietojärjestelmän lokitussuunnitelman yhteistyössä Tilaajan kanssa ja 
toteuttaa tietojärjestelmän lokituksen sen mukaisesti. Teknisen lokituksen lisäksi 
lokituksessa tulee huomioida ns. audit trail. Lokitussuunnitelma tulee versioida. 
Toimittaja toteuttaa tietojärjestelmän lokien lähettämisen Tilaajan hallinnoimaan 
keskitettyyn lokienhallintajärjestelmään Tilaajan ohjeistuksen mukaisesti. 
Toimittaja ylläpitää lokitussuunnitelmaa ja tekee siihen tarvittavat muutokset 
lokitustarpeen muuttuessa. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Tilaaja suorittaa itsenäisesti tai kolmannen 
osapuolen toimesta lokituksen tarkastuksen, jossa toteutettua lokitusta verrataan 
lokitussuunnitelman uusimpaan versioon. 
  
 
 
 
2.3 Toimittaja seuraa ja ylläpitää vastuullaan olevien ympäristöjen 
tietoturvallisuutta, joita käytetään tietojärjestelmän kehittämiseen. 
Toimittaja ylläpitää listaa vastuullaan olevista, tietojärjestelmän kehittämiseen 
käytettävistä, kehitys- ja testiympäristöistä ja niiden ohjelmistoista versiotietoineen. 
Toimittaja seuraa edellä mainittujen ympäristöjen ja ohjelmistojen haavoittuvuus- ja 
tietoturvapäivitysilmoituksia ja analysoi ympäristöjen päivitystarpeen riippuvuuden 
huomioiden.  
Lisäksi Toimittaja laatii analyysin perusteella päivityksille päivityssuunnitelman 
aikatauluineen ja päivittää ympäristöt sen mukaisesti.  
Toimittaja huolehtii siitä, että tietojärjestelmän kehittämiseen käytettävien 
ympäristöjen ohjelmistoversioiden (käyttöjärjestelmä ja sovellukset) ovat aktiivisten 
tuen ja päivitysten piirissä. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Toimittajalla on nimetty vastuuhenkilö 
ylläpitämään listaa Toimittajan vastuulla olevien ympäristöjen haavoittuvuus- ja 
tietoturvapäivitysten seurantaan ja tietoturvapäivitysten asennusten tekemiseen. 
 
  
 
 
 
2.4 Toimittaja testaa verkkosovelluksen tietoturvallisuuden 
vaatimustenmukaisuuden. 
Toimittaja suunnittelee ja toteuttaa sekä manuaalista että automatisoitua 
tietoturvatestausta verkkosovelluksen sovelluskehitystyön eri vaiheissa. 
Toimittaja ei saa käyttää testiaineistona dataa, joka sisältää aitoja henkilötietoja tai 
salaiseksi luokiteltuja tietoja. Toimittaja laatii ja ylläpitää testausta varten 
oikeamuotoista mutta keinotekoista testiaineistoa. 
Lisäksi Toimittajan tulee testata verkkosovelluksen tietoturvallisuus käyttäen OWASP 
Application Security Verification Standardin version 4.0 tasoa 2 (L2) soveltuvin osin. 
(* 
Käytettävä standardi on liitteenä Liite_Z_OWASP_ASVS_4.0.pdf. Liite on 
englanninkielinen. 
Liitteen Z lähde: 
https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/raw/master/4.0/OWASP%20Application%20 
Security%20Verification%20Standard%204.0-en.pdf (viitattu 14.11.2019). 
*) Kryptografiasuosituksissa noudatetaan OWASP:n suosituksista poiketen kansallisia 
ja ajantasaisia NCSA-FI -suosituksia. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Toimittajalla on nimetty vastuuhenkilö 
ylläpitämään listaa Toimittajan vastuulla olevien ympäristöjen haavoittuvuus- ja 
tietoturvapäivitysten seurantaan ja tietoturvapäivitysten asennusten tekemiseen. 
 
  
 
 
 
2.5 Toimittaja tuottaa tietojärjestelmän asennukseen, päivittämiseen, 
palauttamiseen ja ylläpitoon liittyvää ohjeistusta. 
Toimittaja tuottaa tietojärjestelmän asennuksesta, varmuuskopioinnista, 
palautuksesta, versionvaihdosta ja poistamisesta sekä muista mahdollisista 
sovelluksen asennukseen ja ylläpitoon liittyvistä töistä ohjeet ja toimittaa ne sekä 
Tilaajalle että järjestelmän asennuksesta ja ylläpidosta vastaavalle taholle. Toimittaja 
päivittää ohjeita tarpeen mukaan ja toimittaa päivitetyt versiot edellä mainituille 
tahoille. 
Toimittaja laatii myös jokaiseen julkaistavaan ohjelmistoversioon julkaisutiedotteen 
(release notes) ja toimittaa sen Tilaajalle ja asennuksesta vastaavalle taholle. 
Lisäksi toimittaja osallistuu omalta osaltaan Tilaajan kanssa yhteistyössä tehtävän 
toipumissuunnitelman ja palvelukuvauksen tekemiseen ja ylläpitoon. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Toimittaja laatii vaatimuksessa kuvatut ohjeet ja 
toimittaa ne Tilaajalle ja asennuksesta ja ylläpidosta vastaavalle taholle.  
Lisäksi Toimittaja osallistuu toipumissuunnitelman ja palvelukuvauksen laatimiseen 
yhdessä Tilaajan kanssa. 
 
  
 
 
 
2.6 Toimittajalla on menettelyt sekä tietojärjestelmään liittyvien 
vaatimusten ja toiminnallisuuksien jäljitettävyyteen ja muutoshallintaan. 
Toimittajalla on laadittuna menettelyt tietojärjestelmän vaatimusten ja 
toiminnallisuuksien jäljitettävyyteen. 
Toimittajalla on myös menettely vaatimusten ja toiminnallisuuksien 
muutoshallintaan.  
Toimittaja käyttää ohjelmistokehittämisessä versionhallintaa. 
Vaatimus todennetaan siten, että Toimittaja pystyy esittämään jäljitettävyyteen, 
muutoshallintaan ja versionhallintaan liittyvät menettelyt. 
Lisäksi Tilaaja suorittaa itsenäisesti tai kolmannen osapuolen toimesta vaatimuksiin 
tai toiminnallisuuksiin liittyvien jäljitettävyysketjujen tarkastuksen. 
 
